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Abstract
Recently Eliaz (2004) has presented a uniﬁed framework to study (Ar-
rovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions
based on the concept of preference reversal. He showed that social choice
rules which satisfy the property of preference reversal and a variant of the
Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes the Arrow impos-
sibility theorem (Arrow (1963)) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) as its special cases. We present a
concise proof of his theorem using elementary concepts of algebraic topol-
ogy such as homomorphisms of homology groups of simplicial complexes
induced by simplicial mappings.
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1 Introduction
Recently Eliaz (2004) has presented a uniﬁed framework to study (Arrovian)
social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the
concept of preference reversal. The preference reversal property is a condition
(according to the expression in Eliaz (2004)) that if social relation (given by a
social choice function or a social preference) between any two alternatives has
been reversed, then someone must have exhibited the same reversal in his prefer-
ence. He showed that social choice rules which satisfy the property of preference
reversal and a variant of the Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes
the Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow (1963)) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) as its special cases. We present
1a concise proof of his theorem using elementary concepts of algebraic topology
such as homomorphisms of homology groups of simplicial complexes induced by
simplicial mappings.
Topological approaches to social choice problems have been initiated by
Chichilnisky (1980). Her main result is an impossibility theorem that there ex-
ists no continuous social choice rule which satisﬁes unanimity and anonymity.
This approach has been further developed by Chichilnisky (1979), (1982), Can-
deal and Indurain (1994), Koshevoy (1997), Lauwers (2004), Weinberger (2004),
and so on. On the other hand, Baryshnikov (1993) and (1997) have presented a
topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem (or general possibility
theorem) in a discrete framework of social choice1. Our research is in line with
the studies of topological approaches to discrete social choice problems initiated
by him. In the next section we present expressions of binary social choice rules
by simplicial complexes and simplicial mappings. In Section 3 we will prove the
main results of this paper.
2 The model
There are m alternatives of a social problem, x1, x2, ···, xm (m = 3), and n
individuals (n = 2). The set of alternatives is denoted by A. m and n are ﬁnite
integers. Individual preferences over these alternatives are complete, transitive
and asymmetric. Individual i’s preference is denoted by Pi. xiPixj means that
he prefers xi to xj.
A social choice rule which we will consider according to Eliaz (2004) is a rule
that determines a social binary relation about each pair of alternatives corre-
sponding to a combination of individual preferences. It may not be complete.
We call such a social choice rule a binary social choice rule. It is abbreviated
as BCR. We assume the universal (or unrestricted) domain condition for social
binary choice rules2. We call a combination of individual preferences a proﬁle.
The proﬁles are denoted by p, p′ and so on. Individual i’s preference at p′
is denoted by P′
i, and so on. A social binary relation generated by a BCR is
denoted by R. We call it also a BCR. Let xi and xj be two distinct alternatives.
xiRxj means that xi relates to xj according to BCR R. On the other hand
x¬
i Rxj means that xi does not relate to xj according to BCR R. A BCR at a
proﬁle p is denoted by R, a BCR at p′ is denoted by R′, and so on.
Any BCR R is required to satisfy the following conditions.
Existence of a best alternative (BA) There exists an alternative xi ∈ A
such that xiRxj for all xj ∈ A \ {xi}. There may be multiple best alter-
natives.
1About surveys and basic results of topological social choice theories, see Mehta (1997)
and Lauwers (2000).
2The universal domain condition means that the domain of individuals preferences for
social binary choice rules is never restricted.




Pareto eﬃciency (PAR) For every two alternatives xi and xj in A if all
individuals prefer xi to xj, then either “xiRxj and x¬
j Rxi”, or “xi and xj
are not related according to R (x¬
i Rxj and x¬
j Rxi)”.
Preference reversal (PR) For every two alternatives xiand xj in A if xiRxj,
x¬
j Rxi but xjR′xi, then there exists (at least) one individual i such that
xiPixj and xjP′
ixi.
Dictator is deﬁned as follows.
Dictator If, there exists an individual i such that for every pair of alternatives
xi and xj the social relation is x¬
j Rxi whenever he prefers xi to xj, then
he is the dictator of R.
As proved in Observation 1 of Eliaz (2004) AC is equivalent to the following
Transitivity.
Transitivity (T) For every three alternatives xi, xj and xk in A if xiRxj and
xjRxk, then xiRxk.
Proof. (1) AC−→ T: Assume that xiRxj, xjRxk but x¬
i Rxk. Then, from
xjRxk and x¬
i Rxk AC implies x¬
i Rxj. It is a contradiction.
(2) T−→ AC: Assume that xiRxj, x¬
kRxj but xkRxi. Then, from xkRxi and
xiRxj T implies xkRxj. It is a contradiction.
As noted by Eliaz (2004) if a BCR satisﬁes BA, AC and the Completeness
(Condition C) (xiRxj or xjRxi), then it is an Arrovian social welfare function.
In this interpretation AC means the transitivity of strict social preferences3.
Eliaz (2004) showed that if a social welfare function satisﬁes BA, AC, PAR, C
and Arrow’s condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, then it satisﬁes
PR. If a BCR satisﬁes C, x¬
j Rxi is equivalent to xiRxj. Thus, the dictator in
the above deﬁnition is the dictator for an Arrovian social welfare function.
On the other hand, if the unique alternative xi satisﬁes xiRxj for all xj ∈
A \ {xi} and all alternatives other than xi are not mutually related according
to a BCR R, then it is a social choice function which is a social choice rule that
chooses one alternative corresponding to each proﬁle. To be precise a social
choice function chooses one alternative corresponding to a proﬁle of reported
preferences of individuals. If a social choice function does not give any incentive
to every individual to report a preference which is diﬀerent from his true prefer-
ence, then it is strategy-proof. It was shown by Eliaz (2004) that a strategy-proof
social choice function satisﬁes PR. If there exists the unique best alternative xi
3From Lemma 1 of Baryshnikov (1993) we know that if individual preferences are strict
orders, then the social preference is also a strict order under the transitivity, the Pareto
principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
3for a BCR, then x¬
j Rxi means that xj is not chosen by the social choice function
derived from this BCR, and the dictator in the above deﬁnition is the dictator
for the social choice function. Eliaz (2004) showed the theorem that if a BCR
satisﬁes BA, AC, PAR and PR, it has the dictator. Then, the Arrow impossibil-
ity theorem that there exists the dictator for any social welfare function which
satisﬁes BA, AC, C, PAR and the independence of irrelevant alternatives under
the universal domain condition, and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that
there exists the dictator for any social choice function which is onto (surjection)
and strategy-proof under the universal domain condition are the special cases
of his theorem.
PAR with BA implies the following condition4.
Strong Pareto eﬃciency (SPAR) For every alternative xi if all individuals
prefer xi to all other alternatives, then we have xiRxj and x¬
j Rxi for all
xj ∈ A \ {xi}.
Now we consider topological expressions of individual preferences. We draw
a circumference which represents the set of individual preferences by connecting
m! vertices v1, v2, ···, vm! by arcs5. For example, in the case of four alternatives,
these vertices mean the following preferences.
v1 : (1234), v2 : (1243) v3 : (1423), v4 : (1432), v5 : (1342), v6 : (1324)
v7 : (2134), v8 : (2143) v9 : (2413), v10 : (2431), v11 : (2341), v12 : (2314)
v13 : (3124), v14 : (3142) v15 : (3412) v16 : (3421), v17 : (3241), v18 : (3214)
v19 : (4123), v20 : (4132) v21 : (4312) v22 : (4321), v23 : (4231), v24 : (4213)
We denote a preference such that an individual prefers x1 to x2 to x3 to x4 by
(1234), and so on. Notations for the cases with diﬀerent number of alternatives
are similar. Generally v1 ∼ v(m−1)! represent preferences such that the most
preferred alternative for an individual is x1, v(m−1)!+1 ∼ v2(m−1)! represent
preferences such that the most preferred alternative for an individual is x2, and
so on. In particular v1 denotes a preference such that an individual prefers x1
to x2 to x3 to ··· to xm. It is denoted by (123···m).
Denote this circumference by S1
i . S1
i in the case of three alternatives is
depicted in Figure 1. The set of proﬁles of the preferences of n individuals is
represented by the product space S1
i × ··· × S1
i (n times). It is denoted by
(S1
i )n. The 1-dimensional homology group of S1
i is isomorphic to the group of
integers Z, that is, H1(S1
i ) ∼ = Z. And the 1-dimensional homology group of
(S1
i )n is isomorphic to the direct product of n groups of integers Zn, that is, we
have H1((S1
i )n) ∼ = Zn. It is proved, for example, using the Mayer-Vietoris exact
sequences6.
4This term SPAR is not deﬁned in Eliaz (2004).
5m! denotes factorial of m.
m! = Πm
j=1j = m(m − 1)(m − 2) × ··· × 2 × 1
6About homology groups and the Mayer-Vietoris exact sequences we referred to Tamura












The social binary relation generated by a BCR is also represented by a
circumference depicted in Figure 2. This circumference is drawn by connecting
three vertices, w1, w2 and w3 by arcs. These vertices mean the following social
binary relations.
(1) w2: binary relations such that x2Rxj and x¬
j Rx2 for all xj ∈ A \ {x2}.
(2) w3: binary relations such that x3Rxj and x¬
j Rx3 for all xj ∈ A \ {x3}.
(3) w1: all other social binary relations.
We call this circumference S1. The 1-dimensional homology group of S1 is
also isomorphic to Z, that is, H1(S1) ∼ = Z.
Binary social choice rules are simplicial mappings. Binary social choice
rules are denoted by f : (S1
i )n −→ S1. Two adjacent vertices of S1
i span
a 1-dimensional simplex. And any pair of two vertices of S1 spans a 1-
dimensional simplex. Thus, f is a simplicial mapping, and we can deﬁne
the homomorphism of homology groups induced by f.
We deﬁne an inclusion mapping from S1
i to (S1
i )n by ∆ : S1
i −→ (S1
i )n
under the assumption that all individuals have the same preferences, and deﬁne
an inclusion mapping when the proﬁle of preferences of individuals other than
one individual (denoted by i) is ﬁxed at some proﬁle by ii : S1
i −→ (S1
i )n. The
homomorphisms of homology groups induced by these inclusion mappings are
as follows.
∆∗ : Z −→ Zn : h −→ (h,h,··· ,h), h ∈ Z
ii∗ : Z −→ Zn : h −→ (0,··· ,0,h,0,··· ,0), h ∈ Z (only the i-th component is h)






Let us denote the homomorphism of homology groups induced by f by f∗ :
(Z)n −→ Z.
Binary social choice rules for diﬀerent proﬁles are homotopic. f for a
ﬁxed proﬁle of preferences of individuals other than i (denoted by f|p−i)
and f for another ﬁxed proﬁle of their preferences (denoted by f|p′
−i) are
homotopic. Thus, the homomorphisms of homology groups induced by
them are isomorphic. Denote two proﬁles of individuals other than i by
p−i and p′
−i. Then, the homotopy between f|p−i and f|p′
−i is
ft =
tf|p−i + (1 − t)f|p′
−i
|tf|p−i + (1 − t)f|p′
−i|
(0 5 t 5 1)
It is well deﬁned since f|p−i and f|p′
−i are not anti-podal.
The composite function of ii and f is denoted by f ◦ii : S1
i −→ S1, and its
induced homomorphism of homology groups satisﬁes (f ◦ii)∗ = f∗◦ii∗, for all i.
The composite function of ∆ and f is denoted by f ◦ ∆ : S1
i −→ S1, and its
induced homomorphism of homology groups satisﬁes (f ◦ ∆)∗ = f∗ ◦ ∆∗. From
(1) we obtain
(f ◦ ∆)∗ =
n ∑
i=1
(f ◦ ii)∗ (2)
3 The main results
In this section we will prove the following theorem by Eliaz (2004).
Theorem 1. There exists the dictator for any BCR which satisﬁes BA, AC,
PAR and PR.
First we show the following lemma which will be used below.
Lemma 1. Suppose that a BCR satisﬁes BA, AC, PAR and PR, and has no
dictator. When the preference of one individual (denoted by i) is (234···m1),
and the preferences of all other individuals are v1, then we have
x1Rxj and x¬
j Rx1 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1,x2}
6Proof. Step 1:
Note that v1 represents a preference (123···m). By PAR we have
x2Rxj (or x¬
2Rxj) and x¬
j Rx2 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1,x2} (3)
By BA there are the following three cases about x1 and x2
7.
(1) Case 1: x2Rx1 and x¬
1Rx2.
(2) Case 2: x1Rx2 and x¬
2Rx1.
(3) Case 3: x1Rx2 and x2Rx1.
It will be proved that in Case 1 individual i is the dictator. In Step 1 we consider
this case. By PR we have x¬
1Rx2 so long as individual i prefers x2 to x1. Then,
we say that individual i is decisive for x2 against x1. Let xj and xk (xk ̸= xj)
be alternatives other than x1 and x2, and consider the following proﬁle.
(1) Individual i prefers xk to x2 to x1 to xj to all other alternatives.
(2) Other individuals prefer x1 to xj to xk to x2 to all other alternatives.
By PR we have x¬
1Rx2. And by PAR we have
(1) x1Rxj (or x¬
1Rxj) and x¬
j Rx1, and x1Rxl (or x¬
1Rxl) and x¬
l Rx1 for all
xl ∈ A \ {x1,x2,xj,xk}.
(2) xkRx2 (or x¬
kRx2) and x¬
2Rxk, and xkRxl (or x¬
kRxl) and x¬
l Rxk for all
xl ∈ A \ {x1,x2,xj,xk}.
BA and AC imply that we have xkRxl and x¬
l Rxk for all xl ∈ A\{xk}8. Then,
by PR we have x¬
j Rxk so long as individual i prefers xk to xj, and so individual
i is decisive for xk against xj. Note that xj and xk are arbitrary. Next consider
the following proﬁle.
(1) Individual i prefers x2 to xk to xj to all other alternatives.
(2) Other individuals prefer xj to x2 to xk to all other alternatives.
By PR we have x¬
j Rxk. And by PAR we have
x2Rxk (or x¬
2Rxk) and x¬
kRx2, and x2Rxl (or x¬
2Rxl) and x¬
l Rx2
for all xl ∈ A \ {x2,xj,xk}.
BA and AC imply that we have x2Rxl and x¬
l Rx2 for all xl ∈ A \ {x2}. Then,
by PR we have x¬
j Rx2 so long as individual i prefers x2 to xj, and so individual
i is decisive for x2 against xj. Next consider the following proﬁle.
7If x¬
1 Rx2 and x¬
2 Rx1, then there exists no best alternative.





l Rxk (xl ∈ A \ {x1,x2,xj,xk}) we have x¬
l Rxk for all xl ∈ A \ {xk}.
7(1) Individual i prefers xk to xj to x2 to all other alternatives.
(2) Other individuals prefer xj to x2 to xk to all other alternatives.
By PR we have x¬
j Rxk. And by PAR we have
xjRx2 (or x¬
j Rx2) and x¬
2Rxj, and xjRxl (or x¬
j Rxl) and x¬
l Rxj
for all xl ∈ A \ {x2,xj,xk}.
BA and AC imply that we have xkRxl and x¬
l Rxk for all xl ∈ A \ {xk}. Then,
by PR we have x¬
2Rxk so long as individual i prefers xk to x2, and so individual i
is decisive for xk against x2. By similar procedures we can show that individual
i is decisive for x1 against xj, and is decisive for xk against x1. Finally consider
the following proﬁle.
(1) Individual i prefers x1 to xk to x2 to all other alternatives.
(2) Other individuals prefer x2 to x1 to xk to all other alternatives.
By PR we have x¬
2Rxk. And by PAR we have
x1Rxk (or x¬
1Rxk) and x¬
kRx1, and x1Rxl (or x¬
1Rxl) and x¬
l Rx1
for all xl ∈ A \ {x1,x2,xk}.
BA and AC imply that we have x1Rxl and x¬
l Rx1 for all xl ∈ A \ {x1}. Then,
by PR we have x¬
2Rx1 so long as individual i prefers x1 to x2, and individual i
is decisive for x1 against x2. Therefore, individual i is the dictator9.
Step 2:
Next let us consider Case 2 and 3. From (3) we have x¬
j Rx2 for all xj ∈
A \ {x1,x2}. Then in both Case 2 and 3, x1Rx2 and AC imply
x¬
j Rx1 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1,x2}
By BA in Case 2 we obtain
x1Rxj and x¬
j Rx1 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1}.
And in Case 3 we have10
x1Rx2, x2Rx1, x1Rxj and x¬
j Rx1 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1,x2}. (4)
Therefore, we get the conclusion of this lemma.
9We can show that individual i is the dictator in Case 1 when there are only three alter-
natives by similar procedures.
10By BA we obtain
x1Rxj for all xj ∈ A \ {x1}, or x2Rxj for all xj ∈ A \ {x2}
Then, AC or T(Transitivity) implies (4).
8By SPAR we obtain the correspondences from the vertices of S1
i to the
vertices of S1 by f ◦ ∆ as follows.
v1 ∼ v(m−1)! −→ w1, v(m−1)!+1 ∼ v2(m−1)! −→ w2, v2(m−1)!+1 ∼ v3(m−1)! −→ w3
All other vertices correspond to w1. Sets of 1-dimensional simplices included in
S1
i which are 1-dimensional cycles are only the following z and its counterpart
−z.
z = < v1,v2 > + < v2,v3 > +···+ < vm!−1,vm! > + < vm!,v1 >
Since S1
i does not have a 2-dimensional simplex, z is a representative element
of homology classes of S1
i . z is transferred by (f ◦ ∆)∗ to the following z′.
z′ =< w1,w2 > + < w2,w3 > + < w3,w1 >
This is a cycle of S1. Therefore, we have
(f ◦ ∆)∗ ̸= 0 (5)
Now we show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If a BCR satisﬁes BA, AC, PAR and PR, and has no dictator, then
we obtain
(f ◦ ii)∗ = 0 for all i (6)
Proof. By SPAR when the preference of every individual other than one indi-
vidual (denoted by i) is ﬁxed at v1, the correspondences from the preference of
individual i to the social binary relation from v1 to v(m−1)! are as follows.
v1 ∼ v(m−1)! −→ w1
Lemma 1 implies that the correspondence from (234···m1) to the social binary
relation is as follows.
(234···m1) −→ w1, and we have x1Rxj, x¬
j Rx1 for all xj ∈ A \ {x1,x2}
Then, PR implies that x3 is never the unique best alternative for BCR so long as
the most preferred alternative for all individuals other than i is x1 regardless of
the preference of individual i, and so the preference of individual i corresponds
to w1 or w2. Thus, we obtain the following correspondences.
v(m−1)!+1 ∼ vm! −→ w1 or w2
Sets of 1-dimensional simplices included in S1
i which are 1-dimensional cycles
are only the following z and its counterpart −z.
z = < v1,v2 > + < v2,v3 > +···+ < vm!−1,vm! > + < vm!,v1 >
Since S1
i does not have a 2-dimensional simplex, z is a representative element
of homology classes of S1
i . z is transferred by (f ◦ il)∗ to the following z′.
z′ =< w1,w2 > + < w2,w1 >= 0 or z′ =< w1,w1 >= 0
Therefore, we have (f ◦ ii)∗ = 0 for all i.
9The conclusion of this lemma contradicts (2) and (5). Therefore, we have
shown Theorem 1. We call the property expressed in (6) the non-surjectivity
of individual inclusion mappings. Then, Theorem 1 is a special case of the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. There exists no binary social choice rule which satisﬁes SPAR
and the non-surjectivity of individual inclusion mappings.
From (5) SPAR implies the surjectivity of the diagonal mapping, (f◦∆)∗ ̸= 0,
for binary social choice rules. Thus, this theorem is rewritten as follows.
There exists no binary social choice rule which satisﬁes the surjec-
tivity of the diagonal mapping and the non-surjectivity of individual
inclusion mappings.
4 Concluding remarks
In Baryshnikov (1997) he said, “the similarities between the two theories, the
classical and topological ones, are somewhat more extended than one would
expect. The details seem to ﬁt too well to represent just an analogy. I would
conjecture that the homological way of proving results in both theories is a ‘true’
one because of its uniformity and thus can lead to much deeper understanding
of the structure of social choice. To understand this structure better we need a
much more evolved collection of examples of unifying these two theories and I
hope this can and will be done.” This paper is an attempt to provide such an
example.
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